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But why do psychologists, with so close an approach to unanimity, reject determinism? Or, first, why do biologists and psychologists disagree as to the theory's validity? One answer that the author, as a good determinist, suggests is that the different training and interests of the two classes determine them to opposite views. More precisely, his answer is, that they employ different methods. Psychologists begin with human *individuals* and their sense of freedom, and, descending the animal scale, are led to hold that freedom is present at every point. Biologists begin with single cells, *chemically* conceived, whose reactions are physically explicable, because physically determined, and finding, in ascending the scale, that all animals are merely more or less organic aggregates of cells, they nowhere have need for any but physical causation.

But, admitting that both methods are useful, which is superior? And which should give way when its results conflict with the results of the other? M. Le Dantec's answer is in favor of the biological method, and this brings us to his most important point. As a method of precision, or, at least, of sufficient precision to test determinism, the method of the psychologists is vitiated by the individualistic error. "The individual that we call A at the time t is different from the one we call A at the time $t + dt$; the latter we should call $A + dA$, dA representing the variation supervening upon the individual during the interval dt ." But, unfortunately, the individualistic language of the psychologists fails to mark the variation, though this always supervenes, inasmuch as a living being changes itself with each of its acts. Consequently, psychologists are constantly conceiving, as unchanged, individuals who have materially changed, and seem constantly to discover the 'same individual' acting differently under identical circumstances. In short, when a problem becomes as precise as is the problem of determinism, the method of psychology is not sharp enough to yield trustworthy results. M. Giard, of the Sorbonne, contributes a pleasant and appreciative preface.

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Ueber die Grundvoraussetzungen und Consequenzen der individualistischen Weltanschauung. VON WINCENTY LUTOSLAWSKI. Helsingfors, 1898. —pp. 88.

"In philosophy Individualism has not yet been consistently worked out. On the other hand, it is in practical affairs that its champions have for the most part been active. Among no people have they been more numerous than among the Poles, who in consequence of their uncompromisingly individualistic tendencies were unable to maintain the integrity of their state, and accordingly sacrificed their political independence" (pp. 6, 7). Undaunted, however, by this national catastrophe, our Pole, in the exercise of his free uncoerced will, has made up his mind to be a pluralist, and considers this view to be "his most proper property" (*sein*

eigenstes Eigenthum, p. 7). This booklet is written in the desire to "present this view with sufficient clearness to make easier for any one the decision to accept or reject it" (p. 7). In the last resort, of course, the decision is arbitrary and capricious, for Pluralism "is as incapable of proof or of refutation" as is Monism (p. 6).

The metaphysical principles of Individualism are expressed in three propositions: "I am a real being," "There are many real beings," and "Only souls are real beings." From these principles it seems that some interesting truths follow. Every thing must be conceived anthropomorphically (pp. 24, 25). "Every atom is internally a soul or a monad," and "the lowest monads have only the very simple feelings of pleasure and pain" (p. 36). "Our body and its organs have no part in the purely mental (*geistigen*) activities." "So far from helping thought, the brain is rather an organ of forgetfulness and thoughtlessness, a hindrance to thought" (p. 17). The only true identity is a "substantial identity," which "takes no part in the play of activities and in the change of qualities"; this identity is a "substance," a "soul" (p. 10). "From the point of view of consistent individualism, it is a necessity that there should be immediate influence of human souls upon each other" (p. 25). Thus telepathy is an *a priori* necessity, and a naturalistic interpretation of it is excluded. Telepathy is also a fact "as well attested as any historical fact in ancient history" (p. 27). However, attestation is possible only when "agent and patient are chosen from persons who are convinced of the possibility of telepathy" (p. 28). All great scientific hypotheses have been telepathically suggested to their authors by "spirits more advanced" than they (p. 32). Napoleon's and Caesar's influence upon their soldiers was telepathic (p. 30).

"Every soul exists without beginning and without end" (p. 79), having forgotten its prenatal experiences (p. 49). "God is the highest essence, limited in his power by the freedom of the other souls." "Government backed by force (*Staatsgewalt*) is a necessary evil, which should be reduced to a minimum, in order to limit as little as possible the freedom of autonomous connection among men" (pp. 79, 80). Majority rule must be replaced by unanimity and the *liberum veto* (p. 47). "The marriage relation is not a contract creating rights and duties, but a free connection resting on love. It ceases in case of incompatibility, or of disinclination on either side." "Truth is for the individual subject alone, and is valid only for those subjects who stand upon the same plane of development" (p. 80). The highest moral law is, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor *more than* thyself" (p. 46).

An appendix shows the pride of this pluralist in the plurality of his publications in a plurality of languages. We have here a list of Lutoslawski's writings, occupying more than four pages, naming sixty different titles in some six or seven different tongues.

Comment is surely unnecessary.

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